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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ON CHOICE OF LAW*
James A. Martint

I
THE ROLE OF DUE PROCESS AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

A discrete body of Supreme Court case law that has been
generally ignored by constitutional law experts' has placed constitutional limits on choice of law. Perhaps because of this isolation,
substantive due process, which died in the late 1930's for the rest
of the world, 2 has emerged as the chief doctrinal basis for constitutional conflict-of-law decisions. Although conflicts authors have
written a fair amount on this subject, none has addressed himself
squarely to the seeming inconsistencies among leading cases. Discussing the cases on a one-by-one basis, commentators have
explained over-all results with such general standards as "reason3
ableness" and "unfair surprise."
Other clauses of the Constitution have been used or suggested
to provide limitations on a state's choice of law. These include the
commerce clause, 4 the privileges and immunities clause of article
* I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the able assistance of Patrick Mears, a third-year
law student at the University of Michigan, in the research for this article.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1965, University of Illinois; M.S. 1966,
J.D. 1969, University of Michigan.
1 See, e.g., W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASESCOMMENTS-QUESTIONS

456 n.c (1967).

2 Substantive due process seems to have found new life, however. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf-A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 937-43 (1973).
3 E.g., R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 136 (1968); Weintraub, Due Processand Full
Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IOWA L. REv. 449, 455-62 (1959).
E.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914).
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IV,5 and the equal protection clause. 6 However, the only provisions
successfully invoked with any regularity are the due process 7 and
the full faith and credit clauses.8 There are obvious distinctions
between the two. While due process has vast influence outside the
choice-of-law area, full faith and credit seems to be the exclusive authority to enforce sister-state judgments. When the question is limited to choice of law in cases not yet reduced to judgment, however, the only apparent significant distinction between
the two clauses is that due process may require adherence to the
law of another country, whereas full faith and credit is limited to
interstate applications. Yet, because it incorporates established concepts of mutual respect among sovereigns, the full faith and credit
clause provides a better analytical aid than reference to due process
concepts in analyzing and understanding leading decisions. It can
also help to determine normative and predictive rules for constitutional conflicts problems not yet examined by the Supreme Court.
A. Full Faith and Credit versus Due ProcessHome Insurance Co. v. Dick
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick9 illustrates the different implications
of due process and full faith and credit. A Mexican insurance
company had issued an insurance policy to a Mexican in Mexico to
indemnify against the loss of the Waverly R., a tug located in
Mexican waters. The policy originally ran in favor of Bonner, of
5 E.g., Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021
(1920), in which the Supreme Court of California determined that the privileges and
immunities clause is violated if workmen's compensation is denied to nonresidents working
outside the state (but employed under a contract made within the state) while residents are
covered. See also B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 445-525 (1963).
6 To cite such cases as Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp.,
262 U.S. 544 (1923), one has to stretch the definition of "choice of law." Currie & Schreter,
UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. Cri. L. REv. 1, 9,
15 (1960).
7 E.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). For a general introduction to
the use of the due process and full faith and credit clauses in choice-of-law determinations,
see, e.g., B. CURRIE, supra note 5, at 193, 196.
8 E.g., Order of Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); Bradford Elect.
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). The text of the full faith and credit clause reads:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970) provides in part,
Such Acts, records, and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
9 281 U.S. 397 (1930).

1976]

LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW

Tampico, Mexico. Bonner transferred the policy to Turner, who
transferred it to Dick. Dick was a resident of Mexico but a domiciliary of Texas' 0 at the time of transfer. He was also a resident of
Mexico when the Waverly R. burned and sank in the harbor of
Tampico Bay on July 27, 1921. A few days after the loss, Dick
resumed his Texas residency. Dick brought an action more than a
year later in the Texas state court, in which he sought to collect
under the insurance policy that Turner had assigned to him."
10 The Court stated that Dick was not a resident of Mexico until after the loss and that
his "permanent residence" was in Texas. He was also identified as a citizen of Texas. 281
U.S. at 408. Accepted terminology identifies domicile with state citizenship (as applied to
citizens of the United States) and recognizes residence separate from domicile. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 20, comments a-c (1969); cf B. CURRIE, suprra
note 5, at 445, 482; Currie & Schreter, supra note 6, at 6. I have attempted to translate the
Court's terminology into that of standard usage.
11 Jurisdiction over the Mexican insurance company was obtained by a quasi-in-rem
attachment of the obligation of two American insurance companies to the Mexican company.
The American companies had acted as reinsurers on the policy. This garnishment was
similar to that in the controversial New York decision of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216
N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). In Seider, the contingent liability of an insurer to a
defendant was garnished to provide quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the defendant's assets.
The liability of the insurer to the insured was contingent on the existence of a judgment
covered by the policy. The case has been criticized because the judgment depended on the
validity of the quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, and the validity of the jurisdiction depended on the
validity of the judgment. The quasi-in-rem attachment in Dick differs in that Dick's
insurance was loss rather than liability iisurance. Thus, the debt was arguably not contingent: the loss had already occurred. The compelling quality of the distinction dissipates when
it is noted that the debt was contingent on the main issue in Dick-the one-year limitation on
actions. If the limitation was valid, there was no debt and the court lacked quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court did not consider the matter at any length in Dick.
The author cannot resist plaguing the reader with a bit of his own legal doggerel, but
pledges that this example, unlike most published legal verse, scans:
How

SEIDER'S LAWYER EARNED

New York lures hungry litigants
As candles lure a moth
And that explains the greater part
Of Seider versus Roth.
The Seider facts are simply put:
A driver named Lemiux
Ran into Roth and Seider's car;
The latter pledged he'd sue.

His

FEE

The jurisdiction he would need
To let him bring the case.
(Now "res" is just a term of art
To which the purists cling.
It sounds obscure but lawyers know
That all it means is "thing.')
An "obligation to defend"
Was what the lawyer found.
You must have seen them here and thereIn Gotham they abound.

The locus of Lemiux's delict
Alas! was in Vermont
Where plaintiffs find that verdicts are
With this bright thought his fee was earned,
Much less than what they want.
And who can doubt it's fair
So Seider's lawyer tried to find
When courts make use of fictions and
They seize what isn't there?
A New York res to base
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The American companies defended on the ground that a
contract provision prohibited suit more than one year after the
loss. Alternatively, they argued that the Mexican one-year statute
of limitations barred the suit. Dick sought to apply a Texas statute
invalidating contractual limitations periods of less than two years.
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the one-year limitation
was contrary to both the statutory law and the public policy of
Texas. 1 2 It acknowledged that the Mexican statute purported to be
more than a limitation on the opportunity to seek a remedy (i.e.,
the right to sue) but rather was designed to extinguish the underlying contractual right after the lapse of a year. Concluding that the
characterization of limitations matters was for the forum, however,
the court held that, irrespective of the intent of the Mexican
statute, the issue was procedural. In reversing the Texas decision,
the United States Supreme Court held that the limitations period
was a substantive matter 1 3 and that application of Texas substantive
law to a case with which Texas had no contacts' 4 deprived the
defendant of the property without due process of law. 15 Although the
result has intuitive appeal, neither of the ordinary meanings of due
process-substantive and procedural fairness-seems to be involved in Dick.
The Texas legislature must have determined when it passed
the statute in question that it was unfair to deprive a contracting
party of his day in court simply because of the passage of a short
period of time, even if that party had agreed to such a limitation. It
is important to note that there is nothing inherently local in the
scope of this principle. Although it may be subject to implied
12

15 S.W.2d 1028 (Tex. 1929), aff'g 8 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1928).

13 The Court rejected nitpicking distinctions between conditions precedent and sub-

sequent as unimportant to deciding whether the limitation issue was substantive. However, it
attached great importance to the fact that the parties had agreed to the limitation, and that it
was not merely statutory. It would have been interesting to present the Court with a case like
Dick but with two variations: having the limitation unexpressed in the contract but having the
evidence show that the parties had failed to include a limitations provision only because they
had relied on the applicability of Mexican law. These facts should have produced the same
result.
14 It is not literally true that Texas had no contact with the case, since it was both the
forum and the domicile of the plaintiff. The late Professor Ehrenzweig expressed his
attitude toward the Court's no-contact assertion with picturesque punctuation: "a Texas
court [was] said to lack any substantial contact with the case despite the plaintiffs permanent
residence in Texas (1).
A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 34 (1972)
(footnote omitted).
15 Commentators have generally approved of the Dick decision. See, e.g., B. CuRRIE,

supra note 5, at 232-33, 271; Leflar, ConstitutionalLimits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 706, 717 (1963) ("No one suggests that the Dick case is wrong or is likely to
be overruled'); but see note 14 supra.
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limitations, it is prima facie a universal statement. It is true, of
course, as Professor Currie once observed, that legislatures often
speak in generalities while thinking of particulars. 16 Perhaps, then,
even though the statute was worded in universal terms the Texas
legislature believed only that Texas contracts, however defined,
should be prevented from imposing limitations of less than two
years. That view, however, is a misreading of Currie and of the
truth. With respect to the limitations issue, it is unlikely that the
Texas legislature recognized objective differences between Texas
contracts and contracts identifiable with other jurisdictions. The
most likely basis for concluding otherwise is the fear that parties
have relied to their detriment on foreign law, and that, as a simple
matter of fairness, this reliance, if justified, 17 calls for different
treatment of Texas and non-Texas contracts. For example, voiding
the cancellation of an Illinois life insurance contract for nonpayment of premiums because the insurance company had failed to
supply the notice required by Texas law would clearly be unfair if
Illinois law did not require such notice and if Illinois were the only
state with any contacts with the case. 18 The company's justified
reliance would make this true even if the Texas legislature firmly
believed that requiring notice was the fairer approach to cancellation questions. In contrast, any reliance by the insurance company
in the Dick case on the one-year limitations period was probably not
detrimental. Extending the period of potential liability may prolong the defendant's discomfort, but it would not ordinarily subject
him to loss that could have been avoided had he known that the
law he "relied on" would not be applied.
A given legislature cares more about applying its universal
notions of fairness to local contracts. 19 The welfare of others is a
noble goal often pursued, but the chief duty of any legislature is to
provide for the welfare of its own constituency. However, barring
factors which objectively distinguish domestic from conflicts situations (such as reliance on foreign law), our universal notions of
B. CURRIE, supra note 5, at 83-84.
1? "Justified reliance" is a slippery concept. Is reliance on the applicability of a particular
16

state's law justified if a given court would apply it only as a concession to such reliance? In
other words, when is a party justified in relying on the applicability of one body of law or
another? When the question is cast in these terms, it resembles the subject under consideration. A party is certainly justified in relying on the nonapplicability of a law whose
application is forbidden by the Constitution. See text accompanying notes 22-24 infra.
" This hypothetical is very similar to the facts in Lester v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F.2d
884 (5th Cir. 1970).
11 Cf. B. CURRIE, supra note 5, at 81-82.
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fairness are simply extensions of our treatment of our own citizens
in purely domestic disputes. The Texas court in Dick probably was
faithful to the moral view of the Texas legislature even if nonTexas contracts were not its chief concern. Moreover, since Dick
was a Texas domiciliary, Texas had an interest in protecting him
from his improvidence even with respect to a contract entered
20
outside the state.
The Supreme Court's opinion did not attempt to comment on
the merits of the Texas statute. It would, after all, be quite
surprising if the Court were to conclude in a purely domestic
Texas case that such a statute violated due process. 21 Yet the
application by Texas of a rule that expressed its notions of fairness
was struck down on due process grounds even though the substance of the rule was not unfair and even though no peculiar facts
(such as detrimental reliance on foreign law) made application of a
generally fair law unfair under the circumstances.
Some factor other than simple fairness must explain why, in
the absence of justified -detrimental reliance by the parties, the
application of a "fair" rule was inappropriate. Several attempts
have been made to formulate such a standard under the banner of
due process. Some are simply conclusory, such as Professor Leflar's proposed borrowing of the "fair play and substantial justice"
standard from International Shoe.2 2 Somewhat more descriptive are
the two most commonly proposed tests, "arbitrariness, ' 2 3 and "unfair surprise" 2 4 (also known under the catchphrase of 'justifiable
expectations" of the parties). Yet even these formulas fail to pin20

Cf Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 10-16, 395 P.2d 543, 547-49 (1964), in which

the Oregon court, applying interest analysis, voided the contract of an Oregon spendthrift
entered into in San Francisco with a Californian who lacked notice of the trust. The contract
was to be performed in California and was valid under the laws of that state.
22 The Court almost said as much in its Dick opinion:
A State may, of course, prohibit and declare invalid the making of certain contracts
within its borders.. .. But, in the case at bar, nothing in any way relating to the
policy sued on, or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be
done in Texas.
281 U.S. at 407-08.
22 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 321 U.S. 310 (1945). See R. LEFLAR, supra note
3, at 136; Leflar, supra note 15, at 706-07.
23 See, e.g., Overton, State Decisions in Conflict of Laws and Review by the United States
Supreme Court Under the Due-Process Clause, 22 ORE. L. REv. 109, 170 (1943):
So long as the state decisions, in conflict of laws, are not so manifestly erroneous in
their application of governing principles as to amount to an arbitrary and capricious
application of laws that have no fair or decent connection with the transaction, they
do not amount to a denial of due process of law.
24 See, e.g., Weintraub, Due Process and FullFaith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice
of Law, 44 IoWA L. REV. 449, 457-62 (1959).
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point the error of the Texas court. From the viewpoint of the
Texas court, there was a clear connection between the facts of the
Dick case and the Texas law applied: the Texas law represented the
fair resolution to the problem. Surely a fair resolution cannot be an
arbitrary one, unless a previously unidentified consideration intervenes. If such a consideration exists, it should be able to stand on
its own, unassisted by the concept of arbitrariness.
"Unfair surprise" is a slightly more complicated potential explanation of the Dick holding. Surprise per se is not enough; it
must be "unfair." In the words of the alternative catchphrase, the
expectation of the parties, to be worthy of protection, must be
'Justifiable." What makes surprise unfair or expectations justifiable?
Like the arbitrariness formulation, these qualifiers seem excessively conclusory. If expectations are justifiable only when a
court may not properly frustrate them, we are remitted to the
question of when the Texas court may "properly" frustrate .the
expectations of the Mexican insurer. It cannot merely be when it
would be "fair" to do so. As claimed above, fairness itself is not
violated by the lower courts' decisions in Dick. The same comments
are true for the "unfair surprise" formula. I do not suggest in
attacking these formulas that they are meaningless. All legal formulas of significance rely on words that are somewhat imprecie,
and sometimes we must be satisfied with highly imprecise formulas
like "fair play and substantial justice" or "all deliberate speed."
Nonetheless, either these formulas are simply restatements of the
fairness standard, or they stand for something that seems terribly
elusive.
Other constitutional provisions do not apply for a variety of
reasons. Since the facts of the Dick case are centered almost entirely
in Mexico, the commerce clause is inapplicable. There is no question of article IV privileges and immunities, since Texas applied its
law as it would have in a domestic case; moreover, none of the
defendants was a citizen.2 5 Similarly, the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment is inapplicable for lack of some kind of
discrimination. Full faith and credit was ruled out by the Court
25 The principal defendant, Compafiia General Anglo-Mexicana de Seguros S.A., was a
Mexican corporation. The reinsurers of the Mexican insurance contract, the Home Insurance Co. and Franklin Insurance Co., were New York corporations. 281 U.S. at 402. Courts
have consistently held that corporations are not "citizens" within the meaning of the
privileges and immunities clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2,.d. 1). E.g., Blake v. McClung, 172
U.S. 239 (1898); Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1353-54 n.
77 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972) (collecting
authorities).
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itself in Dick26 because it applies only to the laws of other states. For
the moment, however, let us put aside that limitation and see
whether the full faith and credit clause might otherwise be applicable.
Just as due process primarily looks toward the relationship
between the state and the individual, full faith and credit regulates
relations among the states. By its own terms the due process clause
refers to "any State" and "any person," while the full faith and
credit clause speaks of "each State" giving proper respect to the
official acts of "every other State." Analytically, the full faith and
credit clause invites consideration of the interests of other jurisdictions. A policy concentrating on the interests of other jurisdictions
would rationalize the result in Dick and avoid the problem posed by
a substantive due process analysis: Texas may view enforcement of
a one-year limitation clause in an insurance contract as unfair. But
the observation made earlier-2 7-that Texas has a stronger legitimate concern about such unfairness when the contract has close
Texas connections than when it does not-serves as the basis for
distinguishing Dick from domestic Texas contracts cases that also
discuss similar notions of fairness. Mexico's interests in the Dick
case were almost overwhelming in comparison to those of Texas.
The negotiations for insurance, transfers of the policy, the original
insured party, the location of the insured risk, the permanent
location of the defendant and the temporary location of the plaintiff were all in Mexico. Mexican contract law upholding the oneyear limitation clause protected parties contracting in Mexico, and
in this case protected a Mexican defendant dealing with a Mexican
insured, neither of whom had ever engaged in any activity related
to the contract outside of Mexico. Thus, under the Mexican statute
of limitations, a Mexican litigant who had not operated outside the
country was protected from suit after the passage of what Mexico
deemed to be a reasonable amount of time. In contrast, the more
limited interest of Texas was to protect its domiciliary from his own
improvidence undertaken outside the state. Under such circumstances, respect among sovereigns for their respective rights to
govern essentially domestic transactions called for Texas to submerge its feelings as to the "right" way to decide the case and yield
to Mexico's claims. The deference is to the sovereignty of Mexico
and not to the personal rights of the parties.
26 281 U.S. at 410-11.
27 See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
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This proposition is more easily analyzed if we assume that Dick
was a domiciliary of Montana instead of Texas, and that the
insurance policy was never assigned to the American companies
which were defendants in Dick. Texas would then have a moral
judgment on the proper resolution of the dispute between Dick
and the insurance companies, but a minimal interest in the successful application of its moral judgment. If the role of Montana in this
hypothetical is ignored and only Texas and Mexico are considered.,
it would take a certain degree of self-righteousness on the part of
Texas to impose its own solution, even if it is the fair or moral
solution as Texas sees it, when a different view was held by an
interested jurisdiction.
This analysis is essentially unchanged when we add the fact
that the Mexican insurance company reinsured with the New York
companies named in the Texas suit (unless we wish to burden such
assignments with changes of applicable law). The more difficult
factor to consider is the Texas domicile of Dick. That domicile
seems to give Texas an interest as strong as that of Mexico in the
achievement of a fair resolution of the case. Indeed, Professor
Ehrenzweig apparently concluded that the domicile of Dick justified application of the Texas limitations statute. 28 The remaining
important element of full faith and credit is the "legitimacy" of
such an interest. We intuitively feel that the overwhelming Mexican
contacts with the Dick case as compared to the solitary Texas
contact of Dick's domicile make the Mexican interests legitimate to
assert and do not legitimize the Texas interests. A strong element
of this intuitive feeling is the principle of territoriality. If the events
in the Dick case had occurred in Texas, and if the domiciles of all
parties were unchanged we could probably justify the application
of Texas law on constitutional grounds (even though we might not
choose to apply it for nonconstitutional reasons).
Territoriality serves a function that is not absolutely necessary
in the conflict of laws. If Texas had been free of constitutional
restraints from applying its own law in the Dick case, it would
happily have done so despite the absence of physical contacts. The
need for a principle such as territoriality arises only if one is
digsatisfied with a totally fragmented approach whereby each jurisdiction simply pursues its own interests.
Since the purpose of the full faith and credit clause was
28

A.

EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF

Dick was severely limited by subsequent cases. Id.

LAws 142 (1962). He also argued that
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precisely to control such excessive provincialism, 2 9 however, it is
necessary somehow to accommodate these conflicting interests.
One approach that has emerged recently is the "better-law" approach of Professor Leflar. 30 In the case of a true conflict between
state interests, he urges the forum to consider, among other
factors, which is the better of two competing rules. Thus Texas in
the Dick case undoubtedly found its own rule superior to that of
Mexico. 3 1 There are two important difficulties, however, in fashioning this approach into a rule of constitutional law. 32 The first is
that of administration. It seems unrealistic to expect states to
choose objectively between two laws, on the merits, when one of
those laws is that of the forum. Even though one can perceive an
emerging trend in certain cases, 33 the determination of the better
law has not proven so clear as to induce the state with the worse
law to change it. Workable rules, especially constitutional rules
designed to deal with provincialism, should not be so susceptible to
local interests. A second objection to the "better-law" approach as a
constitutional standard is that it requires federal courts to make a
decision, based on federal law, as to which is the sulstantively
better state rule. Choosing between substantive rules by judging
their respective merits constitutes an act of substantive lawmaking
in itself. Although such lawmaking is not as extensive or intrusive
as a general federal common law, it runs counter to the spirit of
federalism inherent in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 34 Thus, even if the
"better-law" approach is useful within the bounds of constitutional
limitations on choice of law, it cannot define those limitations.
Professor Baxter has proposed a comparative-impairment approach as a means of accommodating conflicting state interests.3 5
This technique resolVes true conflicts by determining not which
state has the better rule, but which state's interest is less quantitatively or qualitatively impaired by the application of the other
state's rule.3 6 This approach avoids some difficulties of the better29

B.

System, 16

CURRIE,
STAN.

supra note 5, at 199-200; see also Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal

L.

REV.

1, 34-41 (1963).

"oSee, e.g., Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54

CALIF.

L.

REV. 1584 (1966).
31 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
32 The proponents of this "better-law" approach have not advanced it as a constitutional
rule.
See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 355-57, 222 A.2d 205, 209-10 (1966).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963).
Professor Baxter provides the example of an automobile accident occurring in State
X, which has a rule making speeding negligent per se. One of the drivers is guilty of
33
34
35
36
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law approach by avoiding an examination of the particular law's
merits. To a certain extent it may also avoid biased application,
because it does not ask the states to consider disfavoring their own
rules on the merits. The chief difficulty with using this approach as
a general principle of constitutional limitation is that in too many
cases it simply does not yield an answer. In the Dick case, foF
example, it is not clear that Texas's interest in protecting Dick from
what Texas saw as an unjustly short limitation period would be any
less important than Mexico's interest in protecting its insurer from
a suit that it viewed as stale and that was forbidden by a contract
clause valid under Mexican law.
Professor Currie once playfully suggested that the law of the
state coming first in alphabetical order be used to resolve some
conflicts. 37 That principle would certainly dways yield a result and
would avoid biased application, but it lacks affirmative virtues.
Thus, territoriality emerges as a useful principle almost by
default. It works well in a significant number of cases 38 and avoids
the value-laden aspects of the better-law approach, while providing two advantages. First, territoriality provides continuity with
the past. It was an important-too important-factor during the
reign of the first )Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. Its retention
thus provides some stability in the law. Second, territoriality is
congruent with our notions of sovereignty. The principle that a
sovereign has the right to control events within its own borders can
theoretically justify either of the possible results in Dick. Since all of
the "significant" events happened in Mexico, the political principle
of sovereignty could give Mexico the right to determine the outcome. It could also be concluded that since the trial took place in
Texas, Texas has the right to determine the results. The trial,
however, is an appendage; it has no independent existence or
raison d' tre save for the events that took place in Mexico. In terms
of political sovereignty, Mexico has greater (but not absolute) claim
speeding when the accident occurs. If both drivers are from State Y, which has no such rule,
there is a true conflict between the policies of State X and State Y. His suggested accomodation is to apply the law of State Y even though the law of State X has a deterrence policy.
This solution will satisfy the policies of State Y and impair those of State X very little because
in general, a driver from State Y, speeding in State X, cannot assume that someone he might
hit will also be from State Y. Id at 12.
37 B. CURME, supra note 5, at 609.
38 It forbids a state without substantial connection from applying its own law in cases
like Dick; it resolves the true conflict case covered by Judge Fuld's second rule in Neumeier v.
Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 70 (1972); and it
resolves the actual facts of the Neumeier case, covered by the third rule.
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to govern the determination of a dispute arising out of those
events.
By hypothesis we are not seeking a rule which is "correct," or
moral, or fair. The discussion of fairness simply demonstrates that
fairness is not available to resolve cases like Dick. In considering
various approaches to the placement of limitations on state provincialism, the arguments should be judged not by whether they seem
to produce the right answer, but by whether they produce the
expedient answer. Territoriality, especially in the absence of successful competition, satisfies this criterion and has the added virtue
of intuitive appeal.
This inspection of fairness, territoriality, and sovereignty leads
to the conclusion that full faith and credit principles (or their
equivalent in conflicts cases involving other countries), rather than
due process principles, should control in determining constitutional limitations on choice of law. One may concede that cases of
blatant overstepping by a state may evoke feelings that the state is
behaving unfairly, despite any argument made above about unfairness. However, such feelings may derive from notions of intersovereign relations, and not directly from fundamental notions of
fairness. An analogy to another area of law is useful. Assume that A
contracts with B to provide services for C. Since C is a lazy
good-for-nothing and does not "deserve" such services, A decides
not to perform. A is not behaving unfairly toward C in the fundamental sense of the relationship between A and C. Nonetheless, one
feels that A's obligation to B makes it unfair to C (as well as to B)
for A to renege. In a similar way, the litigants in a constitutional
conflicts case represent state interests and feel that they have the
right to require the forum to honor its obligations to other jurisdictions which they as litigants represent. Seen in this light, unfair
surprise is no longer a bootstrapping concept since the unfairness
of the surprise is attributable to the state's failure to give proper
deference to the interests of other states.
The primary importance of deference to the interests of other
sovereigns, as opposed to fairness, is supported by two lines of case
authority on the fringes of the law of conflicts. One is the rule
established in Skiriotes v. Florida;3 9 the other is the act-of-state
doctrine. The defendant in Skiriotes was convicted of violating
a Florida statute by using diving gear in gathering natural
sponges out of waters adjoining Florida but more than three
39 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
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miles from shore. The Florida courts emphasized the issue of
40
whether Florida's boundaries extended past the three-mile limit.

The United States Supreme Court, however, found it unnecessary
to assess Florida's undersea rights. It concluded that Florida could
criminalize the activities of its own citizens occurring beyond its
borders if those activities affected state interests and if the claim of
authority did not infringe the rights of other governments or their
citizens. Two of these three conditions-that the defendant be a
Florida citizen and that the rights of other governments not be
infringed-are oriented toward mutual respect among sovereigns.
Action by the defendant in or out of the territorial waters of
Florida was not the talisman; in other words, there appears to be
no due process type of right to be free from control by a state
when one is outside its borders. Instead, the limiting principles are
the interests of other states, whether they are generalized interests
or interests that are specifically present because the defendant is
the citizen of another jurisdiction. Only the third requirementthat the forbidden activity affect the interests of Florida-suggests
that some personal right of the defendant, perhaps due process, is
involved. This requirement, however, is not absolute. In cases of a
state punishing piracy on the high seas, it is either not present or is
present in the attenuated form of any state's generalized interest in
freeing all seafaring commerce of piracy. 4 1 The latter interest
seems little more than a desire to see justice prevail-an interest
which all states presumably share. Thus, Skiriotes and piracy cases,
by dealing with activity outside the forum but not within the border
of another sovereign, eliminate the foreign contacts present in Dick
without adding significant domestic contacts. That these cases allow
the application of domestic law while Dick did not suggests that the
interests of the foreign state, rather than the remoteness of domestic interests, dictated the result in Dick.
Lending support to the analysis suggested here, is the act-ofstate doctrine, which arose in the well-known case of Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino.4 1 The issue was whether an agency of the
Cuban government could recover in a United States federal court
the proceeds from the sale of a shipload of sugar that the Cuban
government had seized from a Cuban corporation owned chiefly
40 Skiriotes v. State, 144 Fla. 220, 221-25, 197 So. 736, 737-38 (1940). The Florida
constitution had historically claimed greater geographical limits, and the state argued that
Congress .had approved such claims by its admission of Florida into the Union.
41 See The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40-41 (1826) (dictum).
42 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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by Americans. The seizure was essentially an uncompensated one
directed at American-owned companies in Cuba in retaliation
against congressional changes in the Cuban sugar quota. Had the
United States seized the ship, its act would certainly have violated
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. A seizure by Cuba
in American waters would have constituted conversion. However,
the seizure was by and in Cuba. The Supreme Court stressed that
the seizure was legal where it occurred. While disclaiming any
recognition of its validity, the Court gave effect to the seizure.
Justice Harlan's opinion for the majority explained the pitfalls of a
judicial holding that the act of another sovereign, within its own
territory, was void or valid. Such a course, he indicated, would
unacceptably hinder the Executive in dealing with this nation's
foreign policy.
Sabbatino has produced scholarly 43 and congressional 4 4 reaction. It is not my purpose here to consider the merits of the precise
holding. It is sufficient to note that application of Cuban law
actually worked a deprivation of property without due process of
law. Since the deprivation was by Cuba, the due process clause of
the United States Cofistitution was not violated. Yet the due process clause simply embodies our preexisting notions of what due
process is; it does not create them. An act that would violate the
clause but for the perpetrator and place of the act runs counter to
the "spirit" of due process. Thus, it perverts the concept of due
process to hold that the fifth amendment's due process clause
actually required the holding in Sabbatino on the ground that Cuba
was the only country with the requisite contacts. If the holding of
Sabbatino is justifiable, it must rest on a consideration for intersovereign relations. Sabbatino focused on the Executive's right to
control our international affairs, which is chiefly a separation-ofpowers issue, rather than on the appropriate judicial response to
seizures of American property by foreign governments. A necessary implication of the Sabbatino holding, however, is the proposition that the interests of another sovereign may be as important as,
45
or more important than, our notions of fundamental fairness.
43 E.g., Collinsion, Sabbatino: The Treatment of InternationalLaw in United States Courts, 3
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT. L. 27 (1964); Domke, Act of State: Sabbatino in the Courts and in Congress,
3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT. L. 99 (1964); Spiro, ForeignActs of State and the Conflict of Laws, 16
INT. & COMp. L.Q. 145 (1967).
44 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1970), known as the Hickenlooper Amendment.
45 If limited to the proposition that the right of the Executive to control international
relations is sufficient to deny Americans their fundamental rights, Sabbatino presents the
anomaly that what the Executive does not have power to do directly may be accomplished
indirectly by deference to its powers.
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Despite the existence of the public-policy doctrine, few interstate (as opposed to international) cases involve a truly fundamental split as to notions of basic fairness. A sufficient aberration
by one state or the other is controlled by a direct application of due
process to strike down the law on the merits, rather than by some
choice-of-law doctrine. 4 6 Similarly, the delicacy with which the
courts must treat the foreign interest will rarely be as strong as in
Sabbatino, since interstate squabbles rarely have the potential for
harm that inheres in international disputes. Sabbatino nonetheless
illustrates that the key to federal limitations on choice of law is not
found solely in considerations of fairness to the individual litigant
or in related concepts that have been suggested as tests for due
process.
Dick does not yield to a due process analysis and cannot be
supported directly by the full faith and credit clause because
Mexico is not a state. Representing an exercise in the development
of federal common law, Sabbatino not only establishes the failure of
due process to account for the holding of Dick, but also provides a
basis for the federal lawmaking power exercised in Dick. The Court
denied that its decision was constitutionally compelled, but indicated that the decision merely had constitutional "underpinnings.1 47 It has also stated in other contexts that federal law ultimately controls our relations with other countries. 48 A slight extension of this principle brings conflicts questions involving other
countries under the umbrella of "relations" and thus makes them a
matter of federal law.
To supply a federal-common-law theory appropriate to international cases like Dick, it is not necessary to create a general
federal common law of conflicts of law. 4 9 The federal conflicts rule
could be patterned almost precisely upon the operation of the full
faith and credit clause among the states (as it applies to claims not
yet reduced to judgment). The considerations giving rise to the
46 Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLuM. L. REv. 969,
1015-16 (1956).
47 376 U.S. at 423.
48 "Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to
state laws or policies." United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
49 The need for a federal common law of conflicts of law has been suggested by some
commentators. See Baxter, supra note 35, at 23-42; Hart, The Relation Between State and
FederalLai, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 513-15, 541-42 (1954) (apparently in favor of allowing
federal courts to develop choice-of-law doctrines that would not be binding on state courts);
Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1191 (1967);
Randall, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws, 17 S. CAR. L. REv. 494 (1965) (limited to
proposition that federal courts should depart from state conflicts rules when there are
"affirmative countervailing considerations at work').

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:185

interstate role presently shared by due process and full faith and
credit are not peculiar to interstate problems. In contrast to an
interstate situation, however, there is no guaranty in international
cases that due process will limit the substance of another jurisdiction's law. The suggested federal rule applying interstate policies to
international situations should include an exception for cases of
extremely unacceptable foreign law. Sabbatino weakens this caveat,
however, by protecting a foreign act that would have violated the
due process clause had the United States been the perpetrator.
Although the full faith and credit clause provides authority to
strike down various abuses of state choice of law, 50 an analysis
balancing the competing interests of the states has never fully
emerged. In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 51 the Court said that it would "determine for itself how
far the full faith and credit clause compels the qualification or
denial of rights asserted under the laws of one state, that of the
forum, by the statute of another state. '5 2 After seemingly upholding a balancing test, the Court followed this assertion with a gutting
qualification:
But there would seem to be little room for the exercise of that
function when the statute of the forum is the expression of
domestic policy, in terms declared to be exclusive in its application to persons and events within the state. 5 3
This pronouncement illustrates the Court's strong forum-oriented
bias when there are critical "events within the state." The absolute
presumption in favor of the forum does not operate when there
are no such events. The arguments made thus far-that full faith
and credit principles better explain the holding in Dick than due
process principles-seem consistent with the importance attached
to events within the state by PacificEmployers. Attaching importance
to the physical location of events is more clearly connected with
state sovereignty over events (full faith and credit) than with the
right of the state, as against the individual, to regulate the event
(due process). The distinction may not be fundamental in cases like
Pacific Employers, but it was critical in Watson v. Employers Liability
Insurance Co.54 and Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 5 5 wherein the
50

See text accompanying note 8 supra.

51 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
52
53

Id. at 502.
Id. at 502-03.

54 348 U.S. 66 (1954). See Part C infra.

5- 377 U.S. 179 (1964). See Part C infra.
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process of locating "events within the state" became much more
difficult. When the location of a critical event within the state is
questionable, it becomes far more important to examine the competing interests of the states through some kind of balancing
process-despite the language used in Pacific Employers. The balance may retain a bias toward the forum, but the result will not be
absolute, as it is when a critical event taking place within the forum
is undisputed.
Several kinds of possible interest-balancing thus emerge. One
can attempt to balance the "legitimacy" of two states' interests, to
balance their relative strengths, to balance the degree to which
each over-all interest would be impaired by nonapplication in the
particular case, 56 and finally to balance their merits. Pacifc Employers
illustrates that the Supreme Court's present approach involves only
"legitimacy." The location of an event within the state legitimizes
the state's preference for its own policy, even if that policy is
weaker than that of a competing state (as long as it is not nonexistent), even though it would be impaired less than another state's
interest by nonapplication and even though it is not the "better"
policy. A better rule results, however, if the "legitimacy" balance is
confined to cases in which there is a clear critical event within the
state whose law is being applied, as in Pacific Employers. When the
presence of critical events within the forum is less clear, a weighing
of the strengths of the states' interests, as well as their legitimacy,
may be appropriate. 57
B. A Comparison with the Rules of In Personam Jurisdiction
Rejection of a due process analysis for choice-of-law questions
(i.e., legislative jurisdiction) does not entail rejection of a due
58
process approach to judicial jurisdiction. If "specific" jurisdiction
is considered apart from "general" jurisdiction, 59 transient jurisdiction, 60 and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, the "contacts" requirements
56 Dubbed "comparative impairment" by Professor Baxter, this third kind of weighing
differs greatly from present practice. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra.
" This point is developed more fully in connection with the discussion of Watson and
Clay in Part C infra.
58 The term is used here in the sense of von Mehren and Trautman to indicate
jurisdiction limited to the right to try issues related to the forum, and not all claims against
the defendant. Von Mehren & Trautman,Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
_ARv. L. Rzv. 1121, 1144-45 (1966).
59 "General" jurisdiction is the right to try any issue related to the defendant. Id. at
1136.
6' The term indicates jurisdiction obtained by casual service on the defendant within
the forum and unsupported by other contacts between the defendant and the forum.
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for legislative and judicial jurisdiction are remarkably similar.,
Commentators 61 have unsuccessfully sought a unified limitations
theory. Although the limits of both forms of jurisdiction are
defined by roughly equal requirements of contact, 62 judicial at64
63
titudes toward the two are different. Legislatures and judges
often indicate a desire to pursue the judicial jurisdiction of their
state to "the limits of due process." The clear implication is that
such a course is socially desirable. Choice-of-law decisions that
barely pass constitutional muster, however, are not generally
greeted with enthusiasm. Commentators often note that constitutional limitations exist to curb excesses in state choice-of-law doctrine.6 5 A major reason for this difference in attitudes is the
general absence of full faith and credit considerations in cases
involving judicial jurisdiction. For example, a state which exercises
transient jurisdiction and whose only connection with a case is the
presence of the parties is unlikely to insist on the application of its
own law to the merits of the dispute. Thus, the only arguable
infringement by the forum on the interests of other states having
greater connections with the case is the act of depriving them of
the right to try it. In those cases in which they prefer to keep
litigation at home, states generally seek to assure application of
state law or protection for a class of litigants. 66 The majority of
cases, however, do not entail such considerations, and "depriving"
an interested state of the right to be a forum simply lightens the
docket burdens of that state.
A fine but clear distinction exists between the offensiveness
of asserting judicial jurisdiction and the offensiveness that arises
through the imposition of forum law. The latter does not violate
due process when the disinterested state applies those beliefs to a
case that is properly before it. That state is acting somewhat like an
arbitrator who does not insist on deciding a case, but insists that if
he must decide the case, he be permitted to dispense justice as he
sees it. On the other hand, there are constitutional limitations on
6' E.g., R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, at 121-25; Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 292 (1956); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 58, at
1164-79.
62 R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, at 122.
11 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-5-33 (1969) (asserting jurisdiction "in every case not
contrary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States").
64 See, e.g., Gelineau v. New York Univ. Hosp., 375 F. Supp. 661, 666 (D.N.J. 1974)
(characterizing New Jersey law).
65 E.g., H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 19-23 (4th ed. 1964); R. LEFLAR,
supra note 3, at 144-45.
66 See Tennessee Coal, Iron, & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914).

1976]

LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW

the state's power to localize litigation. 67 Litigants have a personal
right to be free from required participation in distant and inconvenient litigation and from the officiousness of a disinterested
state. Such meddling imposes a burden of participating in the
litigation or losing the judgment, and it does so without advancing
the interests of either forum or litigants. Such action can reasonably be deemed arbitrary and should thus be forbidden by traditional due process notions. In contrast, the litigant's right to the
"proper" choice of law is often the right of a state other than the
forum, which, for purposes of practicality and convenience, he is
allowed to represent. Freedom from an improper assertion of
judicial jurisdiction, however, is almost always the litigant's personal right. The similarity between the case-developed rules governing the two problems is thus not fortuitous, but stops short of
yielding identical analysis.
C. Later Supreme Court Decisions

Let us inspect subsequent Supreme Court decisions in light of
th6 full faith and credit thesis developed above. Watson v. Employers
Liability Insurance Co. 6 8 is discussed at great length below because it
poses the most significant challenge to the ideas I have proposed
and because it proves useful in refining those ideas into a specific
formula for determining when a state may constitutionally apply its
own law to a case. This discussion will also examine Clay v. Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. 69 because it is the most recent Supreme Court

pronouncement that tests my analysis.
Mr. and Mrs. Watson sued in a Louisiana state court for
damages arising. from Mrs. Watson's use of Toni Home Permanent. The product had been bought and used in Louisiana. Under
the authority of the Louisiana direct-action statute, suit was
brought directly against Employers Liability Insurance Company,
the insurer of the Toni Company, a subsidiary of Gillette. A
subsequent amendment to the plaintiff's pleadings to add Gillette
0
7
as a defendant was disallowed.

Employers became the insurer for Gillettte through a contract
that had been written in Massachusetts and delivered in Illinois.
Although Employers was doing business in Louisiana-the basis
for exercising personal jurisdiction over the company-the busi67

Id.

68 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
69 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
71 See note 81 infra.
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ness conducted in Louisiana was apparently unrelated to the contract between Employers and Gillette. The contract declared that
there would be no liability on the part of Employers until there was
a judgment of liability against Gillette or until a written agreement
among Gillette, the claimant, and Employers was reached. That
provision was valid under Massachusetts and Illinois law, but was
invalid under the Louisiana direct-action statute. After removal of
the case from state court, the federal district court declared that, as
applied to the facts of Watson, the Louisiana direct-action statute
was unconstitutional. The Fifth Circuit agreed,7 1 but the Supreme
Court reversed in an opinion written by Justice Black.
Two facts distinguish the Watson and Dick cases, which are
otherwise similar to a remarkable degree. First, the forum had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Watson, whereas in Dick
the case proceeded quasi in rem. Second, the insured-against event
did not take place within the forum in Dick, while it did in Watson.
The Court in Watson rejected the proposition that Louisiana
could regulate the obligation between Gillette and its insurer simply because the insurer carried on presumably unrelated business
activities within the state.7 2 It would be hard to make such an
agreement convincingly, although Justice Frankfurter made an unsuccessful effort in his concurring opinion.73 The majority wished
71

202 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1953).

72 Labruzzo v. State Wide Ins. Co., 77 Misc. 2d 455, 353 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Sup. Ct. 1974),

involved the same issues as those in Watson, except that the insurer was not doing business in
Louisiana. The action was to enforce a default judgment entered in Louisiana against the
insurance company for an automobile accident involving the company's insured. The
Louisiana direct-action statute imposed substantive liability, and its long-arm statute was
used to obtain jurisdiction over the company. Asked to enforce the judgment, the New York
court first looked to the jurisdictional question. It held that the act of insuring one who
entered Louisiana, in connection with the company's expectation that the insured might do
so, supplied "minimum contact." On the basis of Watson, the Louisiana statute was found to
satisfy the "fair play and substantial justice" jurisdictional test of InternationalShoe. The court
then assessed the reasonableness of maintaining such an action, with particular reference to
the merits of the direct-action statute. An examination of the merits would ordinarily have
been foreclosed: once it is determined that the state court rendering the original judgment
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, errors-even constitutional errors-are
irrelevant. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
The Labruzzo court upheld Louisiana jurisdiction on the ground that the contacts were
no more tenuous and casual than in Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The whole controversy about Seider stems from the tortfeasor's lack of
"1minimum contacts" with New York; the case proceeds on a quasi-in-rem theory. If there
had been enough contacts in Seider to satisfy InternationalShoe, the quasi-in-rem theory would
have been at most a curiosity of New York law, and not the focus of a dispute about its
constitutionality. See, e.g., Comment, Garnishmentof Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the
Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. Rxv. 550 (1967).
73 348 U.S. at 74. Justice Frankfurter argued that the state had the right to exclude the
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to establish a broader rule. The opinion gives no indication that the

defendant's business activities in the state had any effect beyond
providing the state with general personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. On the other hand, the majority found it significant (if
not controlling) that the accident took place in Louisiana.
In Pacific Employers, an earlier case, a Massachusetts employee
who had entered into an employment contract in Massachusetts
had been sent temporarily to California, where he was then injured. He sued under the California Worker Compensation Act.
The Court in Pacific Employers indicated that forum interests plus

"events within the state"74 justified application of forum law. That

the Watson Court did not simply rely on Pacific Employers after its

recitation of in-state contacts75 and state interests7 6 indicates that
the "in-state events" of Watson were less significant than those of
Pacific Employers. To a certain extent, however, the Watson opinion
obscured the weakness of Louisiana contacts in Watson by its
company from doing business in the state, and could therefore condition entry into the state
with its direct-action statute. The appeal of the Frankfurter theory is that it translates the
unsolved problem of the case into the familiar legal concept of consent. However, it does so
by using a favorite legal device: weasel words. Justice Frankfurter stated that the Louisiana
law met constitutional requirements "because the conditions imposed arefairly related to the
interests which Louisiana may appropriately protect." Id. at 82 (emphasis supplied). The
main problem is solved by the "consent" idea, but a new problem is created by having to
decide whether the exaction of consent is fair. The original purpose of Justice Frankfurters
approach was to avoid the difficult constitutional issues raised by the majority opinion when
"less doubtful ground" was available. Id. at 74. However, this use of "fairly" and "appropriately" creates its own doubt. Resolving the doubt presumably involves difficult constitutional issues, and leaves the Court with a test applicable only to those cases in which the
party against whom local law is applied does business in the forum state.
74 306 U.S. at 502-03.
7 Although this insurance contract was issued in Massachusetts, it was to protect
Gillette and its Illinois subsidiary from damages on account of personal injuries that
might be suffered by users of Toni Home Permanents anywhere in the United
States, its territories, or in Canada.... [This Court has ... held that more states.
than one . . . may regulate to protect interests of its own people. . ..
348 U.S. at 71-72.
7' Louisiana's direct action statute is not a mere intermeddling in affairs beyond her
boundaries which are no concern of hers. Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are
most likely to be Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care
for them. Serious injuries may require treatment in Louisiana homes or hospitals by
Louisiana doctors. The injured may be destitute. They may be compelled to call
upon friends, relatives, or the public for help. Louisiana has manifested its natural
interest in the injured by providing remedies for recovery of damages. It has a
similar interest in policies of insurance which are designed to assure ultimate
payment of such damages. Moreover, Louisiana courts in most instances provide
the most convenient forum for trial of these cases .... What has been said'is enough
to show Louisiana's legitimate interest in safeguarding the rights of persons injured
there.-In view of that interest, the direct action provisions here challenged do not
violate due process.
Id. at 72-73.
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characterization of the Dick case: "But this Court carefully pointed
out [in Dick] that its decision might have been different had
activities relating to the contract taken place in Texas upon which
the State could properly lay hold as a basis for regulation. 7 7 The
clear implication is that the location of an insured-against risk in
the forum state was the kind of activity "relating to the contract"
that the Dick court would have found sufficient. However, Watson
fails to note that the Dick opinion makes clear after the quoted
language that it was referring to two significant activities that
traditionally would have justified the application of Texas law: the
contract had been made, or was to be performed, in Texas. If the
Dick opinion had suggested that location within the forum of the
insured-against risk justified application of forum law, it would
clearly have gone beyond traditional concepts. Formation and
performance seem to be all the Dick Court had in mind.
When are events within the forum sufficient to justify application of the forum's law? At a minimum the events should be
significant-part of, or related to, the plaintiff's cause of actionand they should provide some significant connection between the
forum and the defendant.7 8 In both Watson and Pacific Employers
the in-forum events were significant to the cause of action being
asserted against the defendants, but the degree of contact they
provided between the forum and the defendant in PacificEmployers
seems greater than in Watson. An entire cause of action could be
built from the events that took place in California (employment
plus employment-related injury). In Watson only the loss occurred
in Louisiana, and the liability of the company was predicated on an
out-of-state insurance contract. But that distinction is not enough:
the contract establishing the employment relationship in Pacific
Employers was made in Massachusetts not in California.
The existence of an out-of-state contract between the parties
and an in-state event which is the subject of the contract does not
always warrant application of the forum's law. Iftwo persons from
Ann Arbor bet on whether Chairman Mao will swim the Yangtze
River this year, that is not enough to make Chinese law applicable,
even if one of the parties happens to be visiting China when the
blessed event occurs. The party visiting China does not carry the
77 Id. at 71. The Court recited almost a litany on the importance of an in-state contact
(see note 75 supra), but proceeded to discuss the question in terms of state interest, and not
chiefly contacts (see note 76 supra). This ambiguity toward contacts and interest makes
Watson a hard case to accept completely at face value.
78 "Defendant" is used here to signify the person who resists the application of a
particular state's law. A different procedural stance could make that person the plaintiff, etc.
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"wagering relationship" with him, making it a Chinese relationship.
In contrast, in Pacific Employers the employee was carrying on
activities in the state of California for his employer. No matter
where the relationship was originally formed, it was ongoing and
active in California. Under such circumstances, California had an
interest in the relationship to pit against that of Massachusetts.
Relationships, however, are legal fictions and not physical
entities. Trying to ascribe physical locations to legal fictions is a
process doomed to failure unless it can be translated into other
terms. A useful formulation is to locate a relationship in a state if
the parties benefit from activities related to their relationship in
that state. Our hypothetical wagerers derived no benefit related to
the wager from the visit to China, but the litigants in Pacfic
Employers both presumably benefited from the presence of the
employee working in California.7 9 How does the above test apply to
Watson? The insurance company in Watson did not directly benefit
from Louisiana. Premiums presumably were not sent from each of
the fifty states, prorated according to the sales volume of Gillette in
each state. Even though they were not so paid, one could attribute
the premiums to individual states. However, the benefit that is thus
attributed to the insurance company in Watson is far more at79 A similar derivation-of-benefit theory proves useful in squaring the results of Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), and McGee v. International Life' Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957). These cases involved the issue of personal jurisdiction, an area closely related to
choice of law. In Hanson a trust was arranged with a Delaware trustee while the settlor lived
in Pennsylvania. After moving to Florida, the settlor exercised a power of appointment and
died. The Supreme Court held that Florida did not have jurisdiction over the trustee, since
the trustee had not purposely availed itself "of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State" (357 U.S. at 253) and therefore had not invoked the benefits and
protections of the forum's law. In contrast to Hanson, the Court, only a year earlier in McGee,
had allowed California to exercise jurisdiction over the insurer of a California resident even
though the court found no evidence that the company had ever solicited or done any other
business in California. The most rational distinction between the cases is the privilege
concept noted from the Hanson opinion: the Hanson trustee was not deriving any benefit
from Florida by virtue of the activities of the settlor in Florida (though it continued to earn
fees), but the insurance company in McGee continuously benefited from California as
premiums were paid. Other commentators do not view this distinction as critical. For
example, Professor Green says: 'The crucial distinction between the two cases seems to be
that in McGee the contacts, such as they were, were initiated by the defendant, whereas in
Hanson they were not." M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 32 (1972) (footnote omitted).
Disparaging the importance of the "unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant" (357 U.S. at 253), the language Professor Green cites from
Hanson fails to support his point. It contains no indication that the party who initiated contact
is more subject to forum jurisdiction than the one who did not. Moreover, letters presumably
flowed between decedent and defendant in both cases. Something must therefore allow the
Court to downplay the importance of this activity on the defendant's part in Hanson but not
in McGee. The benefit theory does so.
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tenuated than the benefit running. directly to the employer in
Pacific Employers from services performed for it by its employee in
California. The degree of connectedness between the defendant
and the forum state was substantially greater in Pacific Employers
than in Watson. The court in Watson therefore concentrated on
forum interests rather than contacts. In other words, Watson and
Pacific Employers together stand for the proposition that when
contacts are ample the mere existence of some forum interest is
sufficient, but when contacts are marginal, much more attention
must be paid to state interests.
Let us compare the interests attributed by the Court to
Louisiana in Watson with the facts that produced an opposite result
in Dick. The stated interests of Louisiana may be summarized as
follows:
(1) Persons killed or injured in Louisiana are most likely
Louisiana residents.
(2) Even if they are not Louisiana residents, Louisiana may have
to care for them.
(3) Local medical care may create local creditors.
(4) Louisiana's "natural interest" in the injured is expressed in its
laws providing remedies and in its regulation of insurance, which
often funds the remedies.
(5) Louisiana is usually the most convenient forum for cases in
which the injury occurs in Louisiana.
The first item takes as a factual basis the occurrence of a loss in
Louisiana, but the justifying interest of the state is the residence of
the plaintiff in the forum. This is not the interest that distinguishes
Watson from Dick, since Dick was a resident of Texas. Because the
second item is significant only when the first is not satisfied, it is
inapplicable to Watson itself. The third item is not so obviously
applicable to the Dick situation-Dick was not physically injured,
thereby creating a class of medical creditors in Texas. However,
the financial loss that Dick suffered was most likely to affect Texas
creditors adversely if his own assets were unable to sustain the loss.
If Dick had borrowed money to buy the Waverly R., and had
counted on the earnings from the tug or, in case of loss, their
equivalent in insurance, to allow him to repay his debts, the
economic injury to Texas creditors might have been significant.
From the standpoint of the forum's interest in protecting local
creditors, the cases are thus quite similar.8 0
80 A possible elaboration of the creditor problem, not limited merely to the state's

concern for local creditors, was recently suggested by one of my students: the real interest
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For the moment, I will pass over the fourth and most difficult
item. The fifth reason provided by the Court for a Louisiana
interest in the application for its statute is that Louisiana is the
most convenient forum for cases arising in Louisiana. This statement is true, but irrelevant. The case would have been tried in
Louisiana, even without application of the direct-action statute, if
the tortfeasor had been the person sued. 8 ' Thus, the Supreme
Court's justification of the application of the direct-action statute
on the ground that Louisiana was the convenient place for trial
overlooks the fact that the direct-action statute was totally unnecessary to have trial in Louisiana. Even if one assumes that the district
court could not obtain statutory personal jurisdiction over the
Gillette Company, it seems reasonably clear-in this postInternational Shoe case-that the problem was one of state law. A
statute authorizing such jurisdiction would almost certainly have
been constitutional. In this light, the fifth interest identified by the
Court seems to boil down to the following: the trial should take
place in Louisiana, but Louisiana has not provided itself with a
service-of-process statute sufficient to assure that result; consequently, Louisiana is justified in voiding an otherwise valid contract term, entered into by nondomiciliaries outside the state,
because that is the only remaining method to assure that the case is
tried within the state. The state's interest in having a local trial
clearly distinguishes Watson from Dick (where trial in Texas was
assured on other grounds and was probably not as convenient as
trial in Mexico), but the method chosen to implement the interest
simply does not seem legitimate.
The fourth interest listed above is evasive. It is a paraphrase of
the Court's language: "Louisiana has manifested its natural interest
relating to creditors is not to protect doctors, hospitals, and the like after they have
performed their services, but to assure payment so as to encourage them to provide those
services. That interpretation sufficiently distinguishes Dick, but in their quest for financial
security, doctors and hospitals are unlikely to inquire where a trial is to be held. Instead,
such matters as Blue Cross coverage will be examined. A general pattern-whereby doctors
know that they are more likely to be paid after the direct-action statute has been in effect for
a few years, even though they do not know why-seems unlikely. The direct-action statute
was available at the time of the Watson decision only when the insurer was doing business in
Louisiana. All in all, the state's interest in the well-being of the plaintiff's creditors is not a
plausible distinction from Dick.
81 The plaintiff tried to add Gillette as a party defendant, but violated the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure by attempting to amend its complaint without leave of court. Moreover,
the district judge determined that Rule 21 of the Federal Rules did not allow this
amendment after the dismissal of the complaint against the insurance company had
terminated the case. 202 F.2d 407, 410 (1953).
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in the injured by providing remedies for recovery of damages. ' 2
That is, the existence of Louisiana's substantive tort law shows an
interest in the injured, which justifies application of its direct-action
statute. Presumably the same could be said about the Texas statute
of limitations in the Dick case. The underlying contract law of
Texas, the limitations statute itself, and the plaintiff's domicile
show a Texas concern for the injured. The distinction between the
two situations is that Texas would probably have applied Mexican
substantive law to the remaining contractual questions in Dick
(apart from the limitations issue), whereas the Louisiana federal
district court would have applied Louisiana substantive law to-the
tort issues if the Watson case had proceeded to the merits before
reaching the Supreme Court. Texas substantive law could not have
been applied in Dick for the same reason that the Texas lirhiitations
statute could not be applied: insufficient contact between the case
and the forum. The correspoding reason that Louisiana presumably could apply its own substantive law to the tort in Watson is the
location of the injury in Louisiana. The subject of regulation by the
Louisiana direct-action statute, however, was the contract of the
insurer, and not the tort of the insured. The contract clause, unlike
the tort, has no firm physical relationship to Louisiana. Thus, the
fourth interest identified by the Court distinguishes Dick on the
basis of where the injury occurred, but it is not clear that the
distinction is significant.
A somewhat unrealistic hypothetical8 3 might test the significance of this distinction between Dick and Watson. Suppose that
insurance companies disliked the result in Watson sufficiently to
exclude coverage in Louisiana from insurance contracts for the
nationwide sale of goods. Coverage in Louisiana would fall to local
companies charging Louisiana rates. Suppose further that the
Louisiana legislature passed a statute declaring that whenever an
insurance company does business in Louisiana and also insures a
company against liability elsewhere in connection with products
that are distributed in Louisiana and in other states, any clause of
the insurance contract extending coverage to other states but
excluding Louisiana shall be interpreted as if it did not exclude
Louisiana coverage. To avoid any claims of unfair surprise, the
state mails notice of the law to all insurance companies doing
U.S. at 72.
8' The issues presented in this hypothetical are similar to those raised by the recently
enacted New York no-fault insurance law. N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 670-77 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
See Part II-C infra.
82 348
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business within its borders and makes the law applicable only to
policies issued or renewed after notice. Suppose finally that a case
otherwise identical to Watson arises. Could an action be maintained
against the insurance company under the Louisiana direct-action
statute and nondiscrimination (against Louisiana) statute? No case
law is directly on point, but of the five interests cited by the Watson
Court apparently each applies with equal force. There is little
doubt, however, that the hypothetical nondiscrimination statute
would be struck down. The interests of Illinois and Massachusetts
in protecting the rights and duties established by contracts entered
there by people and corporations doing business there would
suffer a far more massive intrusion in the hypothetical than in the
84
actual Watson case, where only the place of trial was at stake. If
upheld, the hypothetical Louisiana statute would impose substantive liability in the face of contrary law in the states where all
relevant events took place.
Thus, the five factors listed in Watson must be accompanied by
the caveat that a forum is justified in applying its own law to
marginally related foreign events only when the Watson conditions
are satisfied and when the offense to the interests of states with
closer connection to the issues is not terribly serious. To generalize,
a forum may apply its law to a case whenever (a) the party resisting
application of that law has acted in the state or derived relatively
direct benefits from the forum, or (b) there is some weaker connection between the defendant and the forum, and the forum's
interests are relatively strong compared to the interests of other
states that would be disserved by the application of forum law.
Watson falls into the second category. The interests of Louisiana in
the compensation of its domiciliary outweigh the "procedural"
interest of Massachusetts or Illinois to uphold the contract clause
barring direct actions. Unlike the interests of Mexico in Dick, these
84 The "real" issue was whether the insurance company could be made a defendant.
Since the insurer was liable for any judgment against Gillette, the insurance company's
substantive rights were not affected. Nor would the size of the verdict likely increase if the
presence of the insurer were made known to the jury. A jury would probably not consider a
large and well-known company like Gillette any less solvent than its insurer.
Even if the tortfeasor defendant were small and the jury's knowledge of insurance thus
potentially significant, Louisiana's insistence on its own approach is reasonable. Under their
direct-action statute, the jury is informed that insurance is involved; this presumably
incorporates the assumption that potential bias can nonetheless be avoided by its courts. In
rejecting the other state's approach toward insurers, Louisiana is not trying to accompish a
different result (i.e., a bigger verdict)-it believes that the result will be the same under its
system even if the other states have less confidence.
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procedural interests involve only the place of trial and are not
particularly important.
The chief weakness in arguing this analysis as the "true"
rationale for Watson is that it was not the Court's rationale. The
Court focused only on the sufficiency of the forum's interests, and
did not even consider the nature or importance .of the interests of
other related states. However, the proposed rationale avoids undue
deference to the interests of a forum with no more than weak
contacts with an issue.
86
Another insurance case,8 5 Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,
was decided in a rather off-hand opinion by Justice Douglas.
Clay had insured against the loss of personal property. The contract was entered, the policy issued, and lump-sum payment
made8 7 in Chicago in April of 1953. Clay was then a resident of
85 A balanced perspective of general constitutional limitations on choice of law may not

emerge from an analysis of such a limited type of case. However, the fields of workmen's
compensation and insurance swallow almost the entirety of significant Supreme Court
decisions dealing with due process or full faith and credit limitations on choice of law. Only
one workmen's compensation case, Bradford Elect. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145
(1932), restricted a state's choice of law, and it has been "departed from." See Carroll v.
Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). Few workmen's compensation cases in which the forum has only
borderline interest are likely, since worker compensation boards usually deal only with
accidents that occur within the state or in connection with an employment relationship
existing within the state. The state in which employment is seated or in which injury occurs
may apply its law to the compensation for the injured employee, whether that law is of
statutory or common-law origin. Id. (accident in forum with common-law recovery system,
state of employment with purportedly exclusive statutory system); Pacific Employers Ins. Co.
v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (accident in forum, statutory
compensation systems); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532 (1935) (employment relation seated in forum, accident elsewhere).
Are lessons derived from insurance cases applicable to other kinds of cases in which the
constitutionality of the forum's choice of law is in serious question? When an insurance
company complains about the forum's choice of law, the likelihood of reversing the forum's
decision is decreased. The nationwide (or even international) scope of insurance companies
with the largest number of clients, and thus probably the largest number of cases, may
reduce the state's interest in protecting the interests of the company, at least when the
company was not centered in the state where the contract was formed. Insurance companies
are not pariahs. The various states may give them less protection than is given to individuals,
but that does not make insurance cases useless for the present analysis. The range of issues
that can arise in an insurance case combine with the underlying similarity of relationships to
tend somewhat more toward "laboratory conditions" than is possible in many areas.
Moreover, the combination of tort and contractual issues in a case like Watson or one under
New York's new no-fault insurance law (N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 670-77 (McKinney Supp. 1975))
provide opportunities to assess distinctions between the two issues.
86 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
87 The Supreme Court opinion does not mention that the payment was lump-sum; this
information is found in the court of appeals' decision. 265 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 1959).
The point is significant because a course of periodic payments, some made from Florida,
would have provided some contacts to justify the application of Florida law. Similarly, the
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Illinois. Sun Insurance, a British company, was doing business in
both Illinois and Florida. In July or August of 1953, Clay and his
wife moved to Florida. Two years later Clay's wife took or destroyed some personal property covered by the insurance policy.
For reasons not disclosed in any of the opinions, Clay did not bring
suit until more than a year later. A contract provision, valid under
Illinois law, limited suit to one year after loss. All of the courts
considering this clause assumed that an Illinois court would have
honored it. But suit was brought in a Florida federal district court,
where a jury awarded Clay $6,800.
On appeal two issues were presented: whether a Florida statute voiding contractual limitations periods shorter than the
applicable statute of limitations applied, and whether the statute, if
applicable, deprived the defendant insurance company of property
without due process of law. 88 In upholding the jury verdict for
payment of premiums in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), provides
a critical distinction, for jurisdiction purposes, from Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),
discussed in note 79 supra. Cf. R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, at 136, which discusses similar
distinctions between McGee and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land
Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934), a case striking down a forum's choice of law on constitutional
grounds.
88 A third issue was whether the policy covered theft and destruction by the insured's
spouse. The court of appeals answered the due process question in favor of the insurance
company (265 F.2d at 525-28), thereby avoiding the necessity of answering the others. In the
court's view, the path pointed out by Dick and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta &
Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934), also an insurance case, was clear. (Delta & Pine struck
down an application of Mississippi law to a contract having what were termed "slight
contacts" with that state. It is discussed in notes 87 supra and 98 infra.) The court also
concluded that Watson, which applied to direct-action statutes, was not controlling. Thus, the
court found that there was no reason to avoid a decision on the constitutional issue.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, disagreed. 363 U.S. 207
(1960). It declined to address the constitutional issues because they would be rendered moot
by a disposition in favor of the defendant of either of the two state law questions. Noting
that under Florida law (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1957)) questions of state law could be
certified to the state supreme court, the Court suggested that course of action on remand.
Justices Black (363 U.S. at 213) and Douglas (id. at 227) thought the case ripe for decision,
and Justice Black wrote at some length on the propriety of applying Florida law (id at
216-27).
Apparently in response to this suggestion, the Florida Supreme Court implemented the
statutory certification procedure. FLA. APPELLATE RULES 4.61 (1961). The matter was then
certified to the Florida court, which ruled in favor of Clay both on the policy's coverage of
spouse-caused losses and on the applicability of the statute voiding contractual limitations
periods of less then five years. 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961). In a passage that mystified the
Fifth Circuit panel considering the case after certification (319 F.2d 505 (1963)), the Florida
Supreme Court said that the statute applied to a contract "when Florida's contact therewith,
existing at the time of its execution or occurring thereafter, is sufficient to give a court of this
state jurisdiction of a suit thereon." 133 So. 2d at 738. The federal court mused whether this
language literally meant that whenever the defendant could be served with process in
Florida the statute would apply, or whether it contained an implied limitation that there be
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Clay, Justice Douglas did not probe deeply into the principles
under discussion. He stated that the two mainstays of the court of
appeals' position, Dick and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Delta & Pine Land Co., 8 9 "were cases where the activities in the State
of the forum were thought to be too slight and too casual, as in the
Delta & Pine Land Co. case..., to make the application of local law
consistent with due process, or wholly lacking, as in the Dick
case." 90 After quoting Justice Black's dissent from the Court's first
encounter with Clay, 9 1 Justice Douglas concluded by distinguishing
Order of CommercialTravelers v. Wolfe: 92 "We do not extend that rule
nor apply it here, for Florida has ample contacts with the present
transaction and the parties to satisfy any conceivable requirement of
full faith and credit or of due process." 93 One can criticize the opinion
for its brevity and conclusory nature, but the emphatic nature of the
second sentence quoted, and the fact that it was part of a unanimous
opinion, means that Clay must not be shrugged off as a mere
aberration.
Has Dick been overruled by Clay and Watson?94 Because it
involved only a procedural interest, Watson is distinguishable from
Dick.9 5 Clay, however, is not open to the same explanation. Both it
and Dick address an identical issue: may the forum's statute forbidding short contractual limitations, valid in the state where the
contract was made, be enforced? Despite such similarity, Clay as
well as Watson cited with approval both Dick and principles that
supported the Dick holding. Moreover, Justices Brennan and
Douglas, who are probably as philosophically dedicated to "states'
rights" in the conflicts area as any other Justices, 96 recently indisufficient contacts, otherwise defined, between Florida and the contract. 319 F.2d at 509-10.
No answer to the question was necessary since the Florida court found that the statute was
applicable. Relying on Dick, Delta & Pine, and the first panel decision, and once more
distinguishing Watson, the second federal appellate panel declared the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 512.
:9 292 U.S. 143 (1934); See note 88 supra.
90 377 U.S. 179, 181-82. Justices Douglas and Brennan recently indicated their continuing support of Dick in a dissent to a denial of certiorari in an international conflicts case.
Confederation Life Ins. Co. v. De Lara, 409 U.S. 953 (1972).
91 Justice Black had noted in his dissent that insurance companies tend to be nationwide
and to protect against events in distant states. He observed that the "contract was described
on its face as 'Personal Property Floater Policy (World Wide).'" 363 U.S. 207, 221 (1960).
92 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
3 377 U.S. at 183.
:4 See note 28 supra.
5 See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
96 The term "states' rights" is borrowed from R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, at 122.
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cated their continuing support of Dick in a dissent to the denial of
97
certiorari in an international conflicts case.
Three elements of the Clay opinion seemed to receive special
emphasis. First, the language contrasting Clay with Dick and Delta
& Pine makes it explicit that the latter cases involved far less contact
between case and forum than was present in Clay. Concerning the
occurrence of the insured-against loss in Florida, this point seems
insufficient to remove this case from the Watson and Dick98 category
into the PacificEmployers category. The issue in Clay (applicability of
a no-limitations statute) is the same as the issue in Dick and the
contacts are the same as those in Watson (resident plaintiff and
occurrence of the loss within the state). A second important aspect
of the Clay opinion emphasized the ephemeral contact between the
contract and Illinois law (the company's activity was nationwide, it
knew the property might be moved elsewhere, and it did not insist
on Illinois law in the contract). This point seems a clear but
unacknowledged measuring of the strength of the interests held by
the nonforum as well as the forum state. A third point is that the
company learned of the insured's move to Florida-although after
it was too late to change the situation. That the company was
therefore on notice is irrelevant to any analysis of Clay. It comes
closest to being an answer to the possibility of "unfair surprise," a
factor that some have suggested should limit a state's legislative
jurisdiction. 99 But after the contract was signed, the company could
do nothing to protect itself by use of its knowledge of the insured's
move. For example, it could not cancel the contract. Thus, the
surprise is no greater than that experienced by the insurance
companies in Dick.'0 0 In sum, the significant distinctions that the
Court itself pointed out between Clay and cases decided differently
do not support the "ample contacts! view that the Court espouses.
Rather, they support the proposal for balancing the strengths of
the various state 'interests.
The validity of a contractual limitations period is not the most
97 Confederation Life Ins. Co. v. De Lara, 409 U.S. 953 (1972).
9 Delta & Pine involved more substantial contacts than did Dick, but its authority is
questionable. Dissenting from the Court's refusal to decide the substantive issue when Clay
was first before the Court, Justice Black said: "I, myself, have grave doubts that the Delta &
Pine Land Co. case would be treated the same way today on its facts." Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 220 (1960) (dissenting opinion, Black, J.).
11 See note 24 supra.
100 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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important substantive question that can arise in a contract case
(even though it was important enough to merit protection in Dick).
When the question is raised, the validity of the limitations period is
outcome-determinative. But in terms of altering the rights of the
parties, it does not create liability as much as extend the period of
liability. Thus Clay contrasts with the hypothetical discussed in
connection with Watson. 10 1 At issue in that hypothetical was the
right of Louisiana to create substantive liability when the contract
disavowed it altogether. The same kind of issue in the Clay setting
might produce a different result. Even though the factors connecting Illinois with the case would be equally weak, the issue itself
would be more important to Illinois, and the balancing of the
strengths of the Florida and Illinois interests would tilt more
heavily toward Illinois. Happily enough, this same balancing process removes public policy from the "exception" category and
makes it simply another application of the rule. Insofar as it
expresses a strong moral position, the forum's public policy
strengthens the balance in favor of the forum and thus the forum's
right to apply its own law.
A balancing test based on full faith and credit cannot absolutely predict the result in Clay or any other case. Like any
balancing test, the analysis entails an inherently uncertain weighing
of competing state interests, both in terms of quantity and importance. Nonetheless, this balancing test accounts for the differences
and similarities among the cases, and for the elements of the case
to which the Court has assigned importance. It is more accurate
than an "unfair suprise" standard, the Court's recent emphasis
merely on "contacts," or the ultra-vague "reasonableness" standard.
Thus, a balancing test should offer better, even if not perfect,
means for prediction.
II
SOME APPLICATIONS

A.

The Statute of Limitations and the Obligation to Provide a Forum

The present constitutional limits on choice of law are unsatisfactory with respect to statutes of limitations. The leading case on
the subject is Wells v. Simons Abrasive Co.,' 0 a 1953 Supreme Court
101See text accompanying note 83 supra.
102 345-U.S. 514 (1953). Dick probably should have been treated as a minor variation on
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case. It upheld the constitutionality of the forum's application of its
own statute of limitations to bar a claim based on foreign law. The
plaintiff had brought an action in federal district court in Pennsylvania as administrator of the estate of Cheek Wells, who was killed
when a grinding wheel manufactured by the defendant burst. The
cause of action was based on the wrongful-death provision of the
Alabama Code, which barred an action unless maintained within
two years of death. The corresponding Pennsylvania statute provided a one-year limitation. The district court felt bound by
Pennsylvania law (not an issue before the Supreme Court) and
found that the Pennsylvania conflicts rule called for application of
the shorter Pennsylvania limitation. The court of appeals'"3 and
the Supreme Court affirmed. Since the forum's right to apply its
own "procedural law" was well established at common law, and
since statutes of limitations had generally been characterized as
procedural, 10 4 the Court's decison was not surprising. However, a
common-law exception denied the application of the forum's statute of limitations in cases where the foreign statute of limitations
was so closely connected with the foreign cause of action that it
acquired a substantive character. 10 5 To the suggestion that this
principle be made a constitutional mandate, the Court responded
that "[d]ifferences based upon whether the foreign right was
known to the common law or upon the arrangement of the code of
the foreign state are too unsubstantial to form the basis for con06
stitutional distinctions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause."'
Much can be said for the Court's unwillingness to scrutinize
wrongful death statutes in determining whether their limitations
were intended to destroy rights or prevent suits after a certain
time. 10 7 However, the logic behind the common-law rule lay in the
proposition that one state could not revive a cause of action dead
under the law of another state, at least if the latter supplied the
only "applicable" substantive law. Simons did not represent an
the statute-of-limitations case, but the Court chose instead to emphasize the contractual
nature of the limitation. See 281 U.S. at 407.
103 195 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1952).
104 See, e.g., M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839); In re Mays, 38 F. Supp.
958 (WD. Ark. 1941).
105 See the discussion of Judge (later Justice) Harlan in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime
Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955). Justice Harlan did not gain his well-deserved reputation as
a result of his conflicts decisions. Cf. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d
Cir. 1955), also a Harlan opinion.
106 345 U.S. at 518.
107 The foolishness of similar attempts to dissect statutes of fraud should have been

apparent. See, e.g., Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 2.10 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1883).
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attempt to revive a dead cause of action; the lower court killed a
cause of action still alive in Alabama, the state which had created it.
The former would be forbidden by a vested rights theory, since the
plaintiff would have no rights to prosecute in the forum. In the
Simons-type case, the plaintiff still possessed the "vested right"
supplied by Alabama, but was denied enforcement of that right in
Pennsylvania. It is not logically impossible to deny enforcement to
an existing right in the same sense that it is impossible to enforce a
nonexisting right. Thus, even in traditional terms the question
should have been whether Pennsylvania had adequate justification
to deny enforcement of the plaintiff's right. The Court should have
addressed that question in its attempt to distinguish Hughes v.
Fetter.108

Hughes questioned whether Wisconsin could deny enforcement, on policy grounds, 10 9 of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act.
The case involved a Wisconsin plaintiff and Wisconsin defendant
in a dispute about an Illinois accident. Requiring enforcement of
the Illinois Act, the Hughes Court determined that Wisconsin had
to "give way" to Illinois, even though the Wisconsin statute-similar
to that of Illinois-had been interpreted to bar all Wisconsin litigation over deaths occurring outside the state. Presumably that was
another way of saying that the Wisconsin policy was not sufficiently
weighty to overcome the Illinois policy. The possibility of extending the Hughes approach to Simons was clear. What policy of
Pennsylvania would be weighty enough to deny a forum for litigation under the Alabama act? The Court avoided analysis in these
terms by pointing out that in Hughes Wisconsin had discriminated
against Wisconsinites involved in out-of-state accidents, while in
Simons Pennsylvania had applied its one-year limitation equally to
all. If that was the sole relevant distinction between Hughes and
Simons, the Hughes case was right in result only, for it spoke
specifically in terms of full faith and credit and not in terms of
equal protection." 0
Brainerd Currie criticized Hughes because it appeared to stand
for two inconsistent propositions: first, the holding that Wisconsin
could not refuse to entertain the Illinois cause of action; and,
second, the clear import of footnote ten"' that Wisconsin, having
108 341 U.S. 609 (1951).

109 For a Machiavellian psychoanalysis of the Illinois legislature and its intent with
respect to its own statute, see B. GURIUE, supra note 5, at 302-05.
110 An equal protection interpretation has been espoused by Brainerd Currie. See text
accompanying note 111-12 infr/a.
" 341 U.S. at 612 n.10.
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accepted the lawsuit, had the right to apply its own law. He found
it ironic and inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of full
faith and credit that a forum could be required, by its full faith and
credit obligation to a sister state, to entertain a lawsuit which it
could then decide under its own law. He concluded that the true
basis for the Hughes decision must have been the equal protection
clause, and found support for that decision in Simons. Simons had
condemned "discrimination" ' 1 2 against out-of-state claims, and,
Currie noted, nondiscrimination was a concept irrelevant to full
faith and credit but at the heart of equal protection. 113
Professor Currie, I believe, made a silent, erroneous assumption about the holding of Hughes. The conjunction of the opinion
proper and the footnote did not indicate that Wisconsin could be
required to entertain the case even when it would thereupon apply
its own law rather than that of Illinois. Tie text and footnote speak
to two different situations, the first in which Wisconsin has no
policy and the second in which it does. If Wisconsin does have a
substantive policy contrary to that of Illinois, it is not compelled to
hear the case, although the desire to implement that policy will
usually lead it to do so. If it does not have a policy with regard to
the dispute, it must entertain the lawsuit and may not impose its
own law. 1 1 4 So viewed, Hughes makes eminent sense as a full faith
and credit case. 1 5 When all the relevant parties are from Wiscon112 345 U.S. at 518-19.
113 B. CURRIE, supra note 5, at 306.
114 Wisconsin's rule against entertaining suits such as Hughes was not based on hogtility

to the cause of action, as the Illinois statute was substantially similar to that of Wisconsin.
The rule was based upon a misinterpretation of the Wisconsin statute-a misinterpretation
that led the Wisconsin court not to search further for Wisconsin policy. Id. at 296-97.
115Hughes can probably be sustained on an equal protection theory. My quarrel with
Professor Currie concerns his proposition that it cannot be sustained by a full faith and
credit theory. Distinguishing Hughes because it involved "discrimination" against causes of
action arising in other states, the Simons opinion did not necessarily reflect a belief that
Hughes was based partially on equal protection. The Simons opinion does not use the phrase
"equal protection" in speaking of Hughes. Its "discrimination" comment is equally consistent
with a full faith and credit analysis that allows a significant forum interest to prevail over a
sister state interest, even if the latter is stronger. A reasonable interpretation of the
"discrimination" argument in Simons seems to be not that Wisconsin was wrong because it
discriminated, but rather that Pennsylvania, in treating its own cases as harshly as those
arising in other states, demonstrated the strength and legitimacy of its own interests in
limiting the time in which wrongful death actions may be brought. In other words,
Pennsylvania's willingness to snuff out Pennsylvania causes of action indicated that its statute
incorporated some genuine policy, and that it was not merely an exercise in favoring local
over foreign interests.
Even if the "discrimination" language of Simons is "equal protection" language which
explains the holding of Hughes, an equal protection theory cannot possibly explain the
holding in Simons. The mere fact that Pennsylvania did not discriminate cannot save its action.
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sin, Wisconsin can balance any existing policy against that of
Illinois. When Wisconsin disavows any policy (and attempting not
to entertain the suit must mean at least that), it has nothing to
balance against the Illinois policy and the latter must therefore
prevail. 16
Similar observations may be made about Simons. Neither the
Supreme Court's nor the lower courts' opinions 1 7 indicate where
the grinding wheel that caused Wells's death was manufactured.
Pennsylvania was the defendant's chief place of business. Manufacture of the wheel in Pennsylvania would have given Pennsylvania
the right to apply its own substantive tort law," 8 and a fortiori its
"procedural" statute of limitations. The Court's failure to seize on
this obvious ratio decidendi implies that the wheel was not actually
manufactured in Pennsylvania, or that the Court found some other
reason to conclude that Pennsylvania had no interest sufficient to
justify application of its substantive law. If a Pennsylvania interest
justified the application of the Pennsylvania statute of limitations, it
must have been a procedural rather than a substantive interest. One
of the many purposes of statutes of limitations is to protect courts
from stale litigation and the need to decide disputes on the basis of
faulty memories. 1 19 Such a purpose is as relevant to a foreign cause
of action as to a domestic one. It can be weighed legitimately
against whatever substantive interest the foreign jurisdiction has in
allowing maintenance of the suit. Given bias in favor of upholding
a forum's choice of law, this procedural interest should generally
be sufficient.
In the final analysis, Simons does not represent a satisfactory
from full faith and credit (or due process) attack; otherwise, the application of Texas law in
Dick would have been upheld if the Texas court had attempted to apply a contractual
limitations statute equally to all cases.
1'6 This observation is consistent with another Supreme Court case, Broderick v.
Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935). In imposing insuperable procedural barriers to maintaining
bank stock assessment cases, New Jersey may have sought to protect its residents from bank
assessments altogether. However, the policy was effectively hidden in a procedural
requirement that made no procedural sense. The only apparent interests were a New York
substantive interest and an irrational New Jersey procedural interest. Even given a bias for
the forum, the balance was not hard to strike. The Court required New Jersey to dismantle
its procedural barriers against a suit based on New York law. B. CURRIE, supra note 5, at 346.
117 102 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd and petitionfor rehearingdenied, 195 F.2d 814
(3d Cir. 1952).
"8 Even the first Restatement allowed the law of "the place of the actor's conduct" to
control such questions as standard of care. RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAwS § 380 (2)
(1934).
1,9 See, e.g., Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); Baron v.
Kurn, 349 Mo. 1202, 164 S.W.2d 310 (1942).
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approach to the problem of the application of the forum's statutes
of limitations. Although the case involved only a refusal by the
forum to apply the foreign jurisdiction's longer statute of limitations, little of the Court's language reflects any awareness that the
issues might be different when the forum rejects the foreign
jurisdiction's shorter statute of limitations. 12 0 The procedural interest that can justify Pennsylvania in giving a shorter lifetime than
Alabama affords to an Alabama cause of action cannot possibly
justify Pennsylvania in giving it a longer life. Realistic situations in
which the interest of a state are served by sustaining a cause of
action longer than the state which created it are highly unlikely.
One might therefore suggest a simple constitutional rule with
respect to the statutes of limitations in cases where the forum has
no substantive interests: The forum may be justified in using its
own statute of limitations to bar a cause of action that is still good
in the state which created it, but a state should be forbidden from
entertaining a cause of action after it is dead in the state which
created it. 1 1
The circumstances under which the disinterested forum may
appropriately apply its own shorter statute of limitations are determined by initial reference to the purposes of statutes of limitations. Often-mentioned purposes of such statutes are to allow
repose to defendants after a reasonable time for the plaintiff to
present his claim, to serve as a screening device against unmeritorious litigation (on the assumption that there will be a
tendency to bring meritorious litigation early), to serve as a screening device to reduce docket congestion, to allow the defendant to
preserve evidence, and to avoid the necessity of basing decisions on
stale evidence. Most of these reasons involve protection of the
parties' interests. Some, such as protection from unreliable deci120 The Court in Simons noted only: "Our prevailing rule is that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not compel the forum state to use the period of limitation of a foreign
state." 345 U.S. at 517.
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One minor problem with this rule arises if the state creating a given cause of action

has a statute whose procedural interests outweigh substantive interests-because it has
crowded dockets it wishes to control, for example-it may have a statute of limitations of two

years for a particular type of case even though the statute would otherwise have been for

four years if "procedural" pressures had not been present. Another jurisdiction, with less
court congestion, would honor both the procedural and substantive policies of the statute by
entertaining the case after the expiration of two years but before the end of four years. Since
the likelihood of such a gap between procedural and substantive interests is low, and since
the likelihood of detecting it when it exists is almost nil, the importance of this possibility is
only theoretical. Thus, the proposed rule does not need an exception and can remain: A

disinterested forum should apply the statute of limitations of the interested jurisdiction if it
is shorter than that of the forum.
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sions, not only safeguard the rights of litigants, but also assist the
courts to function efficiently and to command respect. Any given
statute of limitations represents a combination of these factors, but
statutes limiting some actions are more heavily weighted toward
one purpose than another. Some statutes emphasize the function
of screening unmeritorious litigation because the cause of action
involved is disfavored or subject to abuse. Others emphasize the
function of docket-clearing. Let us label the policies that are
designed to protect the courts as "procedural" (while recognizing
that most will be mixed). In most cases where the state has no
substantive interest in the actual subject matter of the case, the
substantive policies behind its statute of limitations will be of lesser
importance. Procedural policies are important to any case litigated
within the forum, however, whether the forum is interested or not.
Associated with each of these components is a time period that
serves its interests. The shorter of these periods is usually chosen
for the particular statute of limitations as a whole.12 2 Thus, any
given statute of limitations owes its duration to a policy that may be
either procedural or substantive. If a disinterested forum's statutory period in a particular case is one year, and the procedural
interests behind the statute would have allowed a four-year limitation, application of the forum's statute would be inappropriate if
the foreign jurisdiction has a statute longer than one year. Since
the forum is disinterested, it has no legitimate interest in applying
its substantive policies to the case-that would be contrary to the
mandate of full faith and credit.
Realistically, however, .the substantive and procedural components of any given statute of limitations cannot be separated.
Legislatures rarely indicate a list of interests with a time period
attached to each, such that we can "rewrite" the statute in any
conflicts case in which one interest but not another is present.
Moreover, the whole legislative process of establishing limitations is
guesswork and arbitrary line drawing. If there is clearly a significant difference between the time periods dictated by the substantive and procedural components of a limitations statute, the
statute probably deals with a fairly narrow problem in which the
legislature feared harassment of defendants. Libel and slander
might be such areas. If a state had a one-year libel or slander
122 In a few cases the legislature may deliberately choose a longer limitation period for
substantive reasons (favoring the cause of action) even though procedural considerations for
similar causes of action resulted in briefer periods.
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limitation but a general four-year tort limitation statute, substantive
rather than procedural interests probably dictated the shorter
period. 12 3 In most cases, however, even such guesses cannot be
supported.
These questions are sufficiently inseparable that any reasonable deference to the decison reached by the forum should keep
the Supreme Court from overturning the forum's application of its
own shorter statute. In terms of the analysis suggested earlier for
cases like Watson and Clay, the forum has the right to impose its
own statute of limitations when a significant factual element,
sufficient to justify application of forum substantive law, occurs
within the forum. When the factual connections between the case
and the forum are more tenuous, or when they are nonexistent
(but for the fact that the case is being tried within the forum), the
forum may apply its own shorter statute of limitations, but not its
12 4
own longer statute.
B.

Wrongful Death Limitations

A full faith and credit challenge to the rationale of Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc.125 was inevitable. Kilberg had been a passenger on a flight that began in New York City and crashed in
Massachusetts. Massachusetts at that time had a $20,000 wrongful
123

However, one must consider the possibility that the legislature thought that slander

involved peculiar procedural problems such as preservation of evidence.
124 This is the rule of the UNIFORM STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON FOREIGN CLAIMS

ACT

§ 2, which has been adopted in Michigan (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5861(2) (1962))
and West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2A-2 (1966)), and the rule of many other state
"borrowing" statutes (See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1972)). A final
challenge to this as a constitutional requirement might arise from the general trend in
constitutional limitations on choice of law to uphold entrenched common-law rules even
when they are not supportable by developing analysis. R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, at 140. Thus,
a state that is the locus of a tort will probably be allowed to apply its own law even if all
parties are from another' state and none of the issues bear on local policies. See, e.g.,
Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969). This trend is probably
healthy, since cases from early in this century illustrate the danger of a premature
willingness to enshrine present beliefs in constitutional rules. E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918); cf. also Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922)
(virtually identical to Dodge but with the opposite result, turning on a very dubious
technicality). Nonetheless, there is more reason to put constitutional muscle behind
statute-of-limitations rules, as the arguments seem far more clearcut. Many persons still find
that the concept of territoriality has sufficient content in the conflicts field to justify blanket
constitutional approval of the old lex loci rules. E.g., Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and
Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 Duq. L. REv. 373 (1971). However, it is hard to
juitify the forum's entertainment of a case that would be barred by the only substantively
interested jurisdiction, even if the common law would justify the result by calling the
limitations rule a "procedural" one.
125 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
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death limitation; New York had no limitation. Kilberg had bought
his ticket in New YOrk, where the airline maintained an office and
did a substantial amount of business. When his estate sued in New
York, it attempted to characterize the case as one sounding in
contract. Traditional rules indicated that the contract of passage
had been completed in New York (where the ticket was bought)
and that the law of New York would thus apply under the rule of
lex loci contractus. The New York Court of Appeals, on an interlocutory appeal from dismissal of the count incorporating the
contract theory, rejected the theory. New York precedent held that
when death resulted from one party's breach of an implied duty of
safe carriage, the proper cause of action lay under the appropriate
wrongful death statute. The real issue, according to the court, was
not tort versus contract, but rather the applicability of the Massachusetts wrongful death limitation. The court indicated in a
lengthy "dictum" that recovery-limitation questions are procedural,
and thus the law of the forum, New York, applied to the recovery
aspect of the cause of action. At the same time, the court made it
clear that the tail was wagging the dog-that the question was
procedural because that characterization was necessary to make
New York law applicable. The desire to apply New York law
stemmed from the strong New York policy, expressed in its constitution, 12 6 against limitations on wrongful death recoveries.
Barely a year later, in Davenport v. Webb,1 27 the New York Court of
Appeals withdrew the "procedural" characterization and relied
more forthrightly on the simple proposition that New York public
policy demanded nonrecognition of the Massachusetts $20,000
limitation. One can criticize the New York court on the ground that.
its statements about procedure and public policy were dicta, or that
something is procedural or substantive without respect to policy
considerations, but these are matters for the New York courts. The
question for present purposes was that raised in Pearsonv. Northeast
Airlines, Inc.128 Litigated in a federal district court in New York,
Pearson arose out of the same crash involved in Kilberg and virtually
identical facts. Unless it found that the Kilberg choice, of law
violated the federal Constitution, the court was bound to follow that
precedent. 12 9 (The constitutional issue apparently had not been
126N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 16; id. art. I, § 18 (1894).
127 11 N.Y.2d 392, 395, 183 N.E.2d 902, 904, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19-20 (1962).
128 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
129 This respect by federal courts for state precedent is required by Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elect. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), which was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in Day & Zimmerm-an, Inc. v. Challoner, 96 S. Ct. 167 (1975).
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raised in the New York state courts.) In the en banc opinions, only
the full faith and credit clause was relevant; both sides in Pearson
apparently had conceded that there were enough contacts to justify
application of New York law to the entire case under the rule of
Dick.
The dissent in Pearson argued that New York was entitled to
ignore Massachusetts law altogether, but was not allowed to make
an award "under" Massachusetts law without the limitations contained therein. 130 As the majority found, this contention is unconvincing. A similar assertion appears in Order of Commercial Travelers
v. Wolfe, 13' but that and the other fraternal-benefit-society cases are
sui generis. Dgpefage is not per se unconstitutional. Since New York
could have amended its statutes or modified its case law to provide
for a recovery (as the dissent admitted), the only remaining issue
was whether or not New York could achieve an admittedly constitutional result by common-law reasoning that was arguably improper. This is an academic question. The spirit of Erie seems to
indicate that the result rather than the reasoning should bind the
federal courts, and the result here was constitutional. 2
Kilberg and Pearson are important precursors to the more
recent Second Circuit case of Rosenthal v. Warren.133 Rosenthal also
involved the applicability of the Massachusetts wrongful death
limitation, which by that time had moved upward to $50,000.'34
Unlike those in Kilberg and Pearson, however, the contacts with New
York in Rosenthal were not very substantial. Dr. Rosenthal, a citizen of New York, was examined in Boston by Dr. Warren. Eight days
after Dr. Warren performed an operation on him, Dr. Rosenthal
died in a hospital while under Dr. Warren's care. Dr. Rosenthal's
widow brought an action seeking $1,250,000 for wrongful death.
Jurisdiction over the insurer was obtained through the New York
attachment procedure first allowed in Seider v. Roth. 135 Jurisdiction
130 309 F.2d at 566.

331 U.S. 586, 625 (1947).
B. CURRIE, supra note 5, at 695.
133 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
134 The relatively recent upward revision of the recovery limitation, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 299, § 2 (1959), made it difficult to argue that the Massachusetts law was some sort of
holdover not really expressive of modem legislative intent in Massachusetts. After a series of
upward revisions, the limitation was finally removed in 1973. MAss. GEtN. LAws ch. 229 (1973
Supp.).
135 17 N.Y.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). Similar to the method used
in the Dick case (see note 11 supra), this procedure is fairly typical of the means used to
obtain personal jurisdiction in most borderline full faith and credit cases. Since the contact
requirements are similar (R. LEFLAR, supra note 3, at 121-25), the forum interest necessary to
131
132
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over a second defendant, the hospital, was obtained by service on
an officer soliciting funds in New York City. In 1969, the basic
general surgeon's liability premium was $192 in Massachusetts, but
was $1,139 in New York. The hospital for which the doctor worked
treated patients from various states including about sixty-six percent from Masaschusetts and about eight percent from New York.
It billed itself in the 1969 annual report as being " 'not a local or
community hospital in the usual sense because its patients came
from literally everywhere.' "136
The Second Circuit panel considered two issues: whether New
York would refuse to apply the Massachusetts limitation under the
circumstances, and whether a refusal would meet constitutional
requirements. The first issue was muddied by the New York
decision in Neumeier v. Kuehner,'3 7 which postdated Kilberg. Although Neumeier dealt with guest statutes, it had announced rules
whose rationale suggested applicability to issues other than guest
statutes. One of those rules, if freed from its restriction to guest
statutes, could be applicable to the Rosenthal situation:
When the driver's [defendant's] conduct occurred in the
state of his domicile and that state does not cast him in liability
for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason of the
fact that liability would be imposed upon
him under the tort law
of the state of the victim's domicile.' 3 8
The court in Rosenthal concluded, by reasoning not here relevant,
that the Neumeier rules did not cover wrongful death limitations. It
then stated that New York's interest constitutionally justified the
refusal to honor the Massachusetts limit in the Rosenthal setting.
The court concluded that it saw "no constitutional difference
between death on the Pearson airplane, death in a taxicab on the
way from the airport and death on the operating table."'139 This
position is specious to the point of absurdity. The ample contacts and interests of New York in Pearson, with the Massachusetts corporation doing voluminous business in New York, selling a ticket to Pearson in New York, and starting the ill-starred
justify a choice of law will generally suifice for specific in personam jurisdiction. Clay v. Sun
Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), however, suggests that there are cases in which a certain
state's law may be applied even though the contacts justifying such an application are insufficient for jurisdiction over the company. Although jurisdiction was not at issue in Clay, the
case is clearly distinguishable from McGee and looks more like Hanson. See note 79 supra.
136 475 F.2d at 440.

137 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
138 Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
139 475 F.2d at 447.
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flight there, starkly contrast the court's anemic show of contacts
and interests in Rosenthal: New York domicile for the plaintiff
and decedent; solicitation of some funds in New York; and the
"national" character of its patients, staff, and reputation. 140 These
contacts and interests do not make Rosenthal a Pacific Employers-type case. No critical events happened within the state.
The solicitation of funds, unrelated to the case and apparently
small scale, is not -a "contact" in the usual sense. Just as the
plaintiffs domicile in the Dick case was insufficient to justify application of Texas law, the interest given by the New York residence
of plaintiff and defendant was not a sufficient contact. Thus, if the
application of New York law can be justified in Rosenthal, it is
because the interests of New York are relatively strong and those
of Massachusetts are weak. Such is not the case. Although the New
York interests are strong (as evidenced by its constitutional ban on
wrongful-death recovery limitations), 14 ' the interest of Massachusetts in protecting its defendant-residents is obvious. In some
contexts the "national" reputation of the Massachusetts clinic might
diminish the Massachusetts interest (as did the national scope of
the insurance company's business iri Clay), but the talk of "national
character" in the brochure the court quoted constituted no more
than puffing. Two-thirds of the clinic's patients came from
Massachusetts142-enough to establish a serious local interest. Although the court's emphasis on interests was welcome, this misbalancing was unfortunate. It might have been avoided if the court
had realized that cases like Pearson and Kilberg involved substantial
New York contacts, putting them into the Pacific Employers category, while Rosenthal falls into the Watson-Clay category, where
forum interests must be strong and intrusions into the interests of
other states must be minor.
C. No-Fault Insurance
Under the New York no-fault insurance law an insurer that
does business in New York is subject to the effect of the law with
respect to a New York accident even if the insured motorist is a
non-New Yorker and even if the policy covering the motorist was
not issued in New York. 4 3 More specifically, "[e]very insurer
Id. at 446.
Id. at 444.
0
142 Id. at 440.
143 N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 670-77 (McKinney Supp. 1974). The restriction to insurance
companies that do business in New York is inconsistent with the purpose of the New York
statute. There is no more New York interest in providing compensation to a nonresident
140

141
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authorized to transact, or transacting business in this state" that
sells an auto insurance policy "in any state or Canadian province"
shall include coverage for, among others, its own insured, whether
negligent or otherwise, for injuries from accidents happening in
New York, "and every such policy shall be construed as if such
coverage were embodied therein.'

44

This "coverage" imposes lia-

bility on the company for losses to the insured (up to $50,000) even
if the policy provides for idemnification rather than loss coverage.' 4 5 The act thus imposes liability when it would otherwise not

exist, specifically in cases in which the policy issued in another state
covers the insured for liability but not for personal injury.
The operation of the no-fault insurance law resembles the
"unrealistic hypothetical" in which Louisiana attempts to impose
substantive liability upon foreign insurers. 1 4 6 Because it would pose
a more serious invasion of the interests of other states than did the
direct-action statute in Watson, the hypothetical statute would violate the full faith and credit clause even though the interests of
Louisiana were identical to those in Watson. The New York nofault law, by imposing substantive liability on the out-of-state
insurer of the non-New Yorker, runs afoul of the same difficulties
suffered by the hypothetical statute.
In approving a no-fault law, the New York legislature wished
to abolish tort liability and substitute insurance coverage in certain
insured by a company that does business in New York than to one insured by a company
that does not. It is far more difficult to obtain jurisdiction over a company not doing business
in New York, but in at least some cases the existence of company assets in Nei' York should
ameliorat1 the problem. Even though doing business is necessary to uphold the nonresident
provision on the basis of Justice Frankfurter's consent theory, the expressed rationale of the
majority opinion in Watson indicated that "doing business" was not required. Thus, the
distinction between companies doing business in New York and those not doing business in
New York does not satisfy the underlying purpose of the statute, is not always necessary
because of jurisdictional limitations, and is not necessary to avoid due process or full faith
and credit problems. At least a modest equal protection objection to the provision could be
based on these observations.
In a very recent New York opinion, Montgomery v. Daniels, 44 U.S.L.W. 2271 (N.Y. Ct.
App., Nov. 25, 1975), the New York Court of Appeals rejected such an equal protection
argument. Its decision was based, however, on the assumption (contrary to my own conclusion) that New York can regulate in any case involving an insurer doing (unrelated) business in
the state and cannot regulate in any case involving an insurer not doing business in the state.
With such an assumption, it was easy for the court to conclude that there was a rational basis
for the unequal treatment of the two kinds of cases.
144 N.Y. INS. LAW § 676 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
145 Id.
146 See text accompanying note 83 supra. A difference between New York law and the
Louisiana hypothetical is that insurance companies doing business in New York and also
issuing policies elsewhere could presumably exclude New York coverage altogether in those
latter policies. In the Louisiana hypothetical there was no such opportunity.
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cases. It did not want a New York defendant's liability vel non to
turn on whether the plaintiff was from New York. Thus the act
bars claims of non-New Yorkers as well as New Yorkers. New
Yorkers, however, have the alternative of their own insurance
coverage; non-New Yorkers would not, unless the statutory provision in question were included. The difficulty with the New York
approach, however, is that it tries to accommodate a New York
interest by controlling insurance contracts with a minimum of New
York contacts. In the process it imposes substantive liabilities that
are far in excess of what was allowed in Watson. Requiring an
insurance company doing business in Texas with a Texan to
compensate the Texan in a manner contrary to Texas law, as the
New York law does, is at best altruistic and at worst an example of
intermeddling. In Watson, at least, Louisiana was trying to provide
for compensation of its own residents; here, New York is extending the principle to nonresidents. That New York provides compensation to Texas accident victims is to its favor, but that New
York does so by disrupting Texas contractual relations to the
detriment of one not originally having such obligations toward the
accident victim diminishes the attractiveness of the approach. The
problem is essentially one for the state where the contract of
insurance is made. That state ought to require companies insuring
its citizens to consider the varying patterns of liability that those
citizens will encounter as they travel in other states.
CONCLUSION

Due process, in its emphasis upon the relationship between the
state and the individual, provides an inadequate theoretical basis
for limiting a state's choice of law. Full faith and credit, on the
other hand, seems tailor-made for such purposes. This observation
does not require abandonment of the case law on the subject, even
though that case law for the most part purports to follow due
process standards. The cases, along with a general full faith and
credit approach, suggest that courts must look beyond such issues
as "fairness" and "unfair surprise," or the 'justifiable expectations
of the parties," and concentrate on the interests of the states
involved. Because the due process approach generally associated
with the area already concentrates on the law of the forum, more
emphasis is needed on the competing interests of other jurisdictions. A weighing of these considerations and a sympathetic reading of leading cases suggest the following rules:
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The forum may apply its law to the substantive questions of
a case whenever (a) the party resisting application of that law has
acted in the forum or derived from the forum relatively direct
benefits, or (b) there is some weaker connection between the
defendant and the forum, and the forum's interests are relatively
strong compared to interests of other states that would be disserved by the application of forum law.
Although the 1930's witnessed a retreat from rigid limitations
on a state's opportunity to apply its own law to cases with which it
had contact, it should not be assumed that such a trend should be
extended indefinitely, or that the considerations supporting such a
trend are similarly valid today. Forty years ago, tolerance for
parochialism may have been warranted because it involved few
costs and because it provided doctrinal simplicity. However, in the
ensuing years, the greater mobility of our people, and their greater
tendency to engage in multistate activities has increased the
number of conflicts cases that arise, and thus decreased the justification for accepting parochialism.
Meanwhile, other areas of the law have grown apace. When
the approach that allows a state to apply its own law in marginal
cases is augmented by expanded bases of personal jurisdiction and
the mechanism of the class action, the combination raises the
specter of massive invasions by one state into the policies of
another, rigidly enforced by the rules of full faith and credit to
judgments. 1 47 The result thus obtained would be attributable not to
a national process of comparing interests but to a race to the
courthouse. Progress lies with more limitation, not less, and with a
requirement that in applying its own law the state give proper
regard to the interests of other states.
147 When a claim has been reduced to judgment, the enforcing state is allowed to
inquire only as to the jurisdiction of the rendering court over the parties.

